China has said that submarines docking in Colombo are routine calls and are for refueling in anti-piracy missions in Gulf of Aden. But this is ridiculous. As the ultimate offensive weapon, even the thought of using submarines in anti-piracy ops is overkill. For that matter, even destroyers, frigates and corvettes are not cost-effective solutions in such missions. Modern offshore patrol vessels and special forces would be more than adequate.
It is clear that the nuclear submarines that do not require any basing facility in times of war were here earlier this year to test India's response and the waters, literally. Operation from Indian Ocean provides these lethal platforms the nuclear option against all adversaries including India.
Conventional submarines, however, do require some form of support on extended missions which explains the presence of an auxiliary during the recent visit. Colombo or Hambanthota could well be on the radar of China for creation of such a facility. And Sri Lanka may find it increasingly difficult to say no to such Chinese requests. Even PNS Ghazi which ultimately met its watery grave off Vizag, was on a mission to sink Vikrant during 1971 war. It is on record that Ghazi was supported logistically by Sri Lanka on its passage to Bay of Bengal.
China is aware that its merchant fleet, which carries more than 80% of its energy needs, and its trade through the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) happen under the watchful eyes of Indi an Navy. If there is any spillover of a conflict with India over land borders to the maritime domain, the Indian Navy is in a position to intercept these Chinese vessels even before they enter Malacca straits.
The presence of nuclear or conventional submarines in areas where the Indian Navy would like to exercise Sea Control would make this task of the Indian Navy a challenging one. It also needs to be borne in mind that the concept of operations (CONOPS) of the Indian Navy is centered on the Carrier Task Force (CTF) whose center of grav ity is the aircraft carrier. Nuclear and conventional submarines would be able to target the aircraft carrier.
Interdiction of merchant fleet by submarines and surface forces is a legacy from the World War though not witnessed since. What the deployment of the Chinese submarines would do as a game changer is challenge the modern surface forces of the Indian Navy in this possible task, to compel a shift in emphasis on anti-submarine forces.
Sea Control by Indian Navy could become even more complicated should there be some synergy between Pakistan and China in operating sub-surface forces in the event of a maritime conflict.
The Indian Navy depends largely on its newly inducted P8i Boeing, the older Tu 142 M long-range maritime and antisubmarine aircraft operating from Rajali, a naval air station in Arakkonam, and IL38 aircraft from Goa to keep track of submarines. This is complemented by a dwindling strength of Integral Helicopters in the form of Seaking Mk 42B and Kamov. While there is a lot of public awareness of the acute shortage of submarines, the same is not the case when it comes to both surface and integral anti-submarine assets. Many new surface vessels suffer from the lack of an integral dedicated helicopter for anti-submarine warfare missions. The delay in the acquisition of Mine Counter Measure vessels from South Korea adds to the challenges of the Indian Navy to keep its channels and vital areas clear of possible mines that could be planted by the Chinese submarines, which are designed to do just that.
It is clear that the government has to move on fast track at many levels and work closely with the Navy to overcome the above deficiencies, which would dent the capability of the Indian Navy to pursue its missions.On the part of the Indian Navy, it would need to work on all contingencies by scenario-building and work in a time bound manner to optimize the efficiency of the present capability to counter the designs of China till it achieves a balanced force structure.
